STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of TERSHYRIA MARIE JONES, Minor.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

AUDREY CALDWELL,

Respondent-Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED
May 25, 2001

No. 230252
Saginaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-025249-NA

In the Matter of DEVION MONTAE CALDWELL, Minor.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

AUDREY CALDWELL,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

ARLIE CALDWELL,

Respondent.

No. 230253
Saginaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-025250-NA

Before: Jansen, P.J., and Zahra and Owens, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the family court order terminating her parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i) and (g). We affirm.

Respondent-appellant contends that petitioner failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite her with her children. We disagree. MCL 712A.18f(4); MSA 27.3178(598.18f)(4) requires that the Family Independence Agency make "reasonable efforts" at reunification. See also *In re Terry*, 240 Mich App 14, 26; 610 NW2d 242 (2000). Here, petitioner referred respondent-appellant to four different drug treatment programs, as well as individual counseling and parenting classes. These efforts were reasonable, even if they did not incorporate the specific suggestions later made in respondent-appellant's psychological evaluation. The statute requires only "reasonable efforts," not service plans that strictly adhere to a psychological evaluation. Furthermore, by the time of the termination hearing, respondent-appellant had been in residential treatment for nearly four months without showing any recognizable benefits. Indeed, in the midst of the hearing, respondent-appellant quit the residential program and opted instead for outpatient treatment. She was already violating the program's conditions for allowing her to make that switch. Thus, there is no evidence that respondent-appellant would have been reunited with her children even if petitioner had referred her to inpatient treatment sooner.

Respondent-appellant argues that petitioner-appellee did not establish a statutory ground for termination of her parental rights. We disagree. The family court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); *In re Miller*, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Furthermore, the evidence did not show that termination of respondents-appellants' parental rights was clearly not in the children's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); *In re Trejo Minors*, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Thus, the family court did not err in terminating respondents-appellants' parental rights to the children.

Affirmed.

/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Donald S. Owens